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CHILDREN’S INTERESTS AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: WHO 
PROVIDED THE EGG AND SPERM?  OR MOMMY,  WHERE (AND WHOM) 
DO I COME FROM? 
 
NAOMI CAHN1       
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 As we celebrate the possibilities of reproductive technology and adoption 
in allowing some lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) families2 to 
raise children, I want to look at one particular angle of children’s interests in 
these intentional families: the ability to receive information about their genetic 
background.  Many LGBT families are intentionally formed through either 
adoption or through the provision of sperm or eggs from known or unknown 
providers.3 In adoption, there are generally only three or four “parents”: the 
adoptive parent(s) and the biological parents. The adoptive parents raise and 
nurture the child, and over the past 40 years, there has generally been little 
contact between the biological parents and the child. In contrast, children created 
through the new reproductive technologies, could conceivably have at least eight 
different “parents”: two intending parents; a sperm provider (with a partner); an 
egg provider (with a partner); and a surrogate (with a partner) who carries the 
egg.4  Assuming that all goes as planned (not a safe assumption in all cases, of  
                                                 
*Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  I thank Tony 
Gambino, Patricia King, Nancy Polikoff, Joan Schaffner, Sonia Suter, and Bob Tuttle 
for their comments, and to Michelle Wu and Zeena Abdi for research assistance.  
Special thanks to Helen Colebrook, Law Commission of New Zealand.  And thanks to 
the organizers of The Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law’s Third Annual 
Gender, Sexuality and the Law Symposium, Beyond Biology:  Adoption, Reproductive 
Technology, and Intentional Families, where this talk was originally presented.   
2  For a class-based analysis of who in the LGBT community can raise children, see 
Terry Boggis, First Class: Economics and Queer Families, in HOME FRONTS: 
CONTROVERSIES IN NONTRADITIONAL PARENTING 117, 119-20 (Jess Wells ed., 2000); 
see also  Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 147, 160-62 (2000) (discussing economic barriers). Although the term 
family can mean many things, I will generally use it in this article to refer to 
intergenerational relationships.  
3  Other families, of course, are formed when a lesbian or gay parent leaves a 
heterosexual relationship. Kate Kendall suggests that it is only during the past decade that 
lesbians have begun to see themselves as both lesbians and as parents outside of 
heterosexual familial relationships.  Sarah Schulman, Kate Kendall Wants Lesbians to 
Keep Their Promises, in HOME FRONTS: CONTROVERSIES IN NONTRADITIONAL 
PARENTING 69, 70 (Jess Wells ed., 2000). 
4 Dr. Machelle Seibel has identified 16 ways to create a baby, depending on how 
fertilization occurs, who contributes the gametic material, and who carries the child.  
MACHELLE M. SEIBEL, FAMILY BUILDING THROUGH EGG AND SPERM DONATION: 
MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES, xiii, xiii-xiv (Machelle M. Seibel &  Susan 
Crockin, eds., 1996).  Professor Vivienne Adair has developed a useful chart on the 
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course), the intending parents raise the child, and the sperm and egg providers, 
together with the surrogate, disappear without interfering in the parent/child 
relationship.5  
 What happens, though, when the child – now an adult – wants 
information about birth parents or gamete providers?  We are painfully aware of 
the dangers in this country of using “known” sperm donors: they may return and 
assert paternal rights to the child notwithstanding an agreement not to do so.6  I 
do not know of any such cases involving egg donors, but I am sure they are out 
there.  The surrogacy cases present a somewhat different situation because the 
surrogate becomes pregnant. Nonetheless, given the well-publicized examples of 
breakdowns in these cases, egg donor cases are certain to occurThus, information 
disclosure seemingly affects families created by both known and unknown 
donors.   
 Without some means of terminating the parental rights of sperm or egg 
providers, problems can arise with identified donors.7  For example, in a few 
states, it may be possible for a known gamete donor to waive parental rights 
through contract, but the long-term enforceability of such an  agreement remains 
                                                                                                                         
different possible social and biological relationships with the intending parents who use 
donor gametes.  Vivenne Adair, Redefining Family: Issues in Parenting Assisted by 
Reproduction Technology, at 
http://www.aifs.org.au/external/institute/afrc6papers/adair.html (last visited Feb. 21, 
2001).  Lesbian and gay families may have four intending parents: two lesbian moms 
and two gay dads.  See Kimberly Mistsyn, Brave New Family, in HOME FRONTS: 
CONTROVERSIES IN NONTRADITIONAL PARENTING 185 (Jess Wells ed., 2000) 
(describing her family with one biological mom and her partner, and one sperm-donor 
dad and his partner). 
5  For discussion of the use of the new technologies, see Kyle C. Velte, Egging on 
Lesbian Maternity: The legal Implications of Tri-Gametic In Vitro Fertilization, 7 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 431, 436 n. 24 (1998/99). 
6  See, e.g ., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986); Thomas S. v. 
Robin Y, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1994); see also Nancy Polikoff, Breaking the Link 
Between Biology and Parental Rights in Planned Lesbian Families: When Semen 
Donors are Not Fathers, 2 GEO. J. GENDER & L. __ (forthcoming 2001); Fred A. 
Bernstein, This Child Does Have Two Mothers . . .And a Sperm Donor with Visitation, 
22 REV. L. & SOC.  CHANGE 1 (1996); MOLLY SHANLEY, MAKING BABIES,  MAKING 
FAMILIES; WHAT MATTERS MOST IN AN AGE OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, 
SURROGACY, ADOPTION, AND SAME-SEX AND SINGE PARENTS’ RIGHTS (forthcoming 
2001) (discussing general framework for thinking about the rights of known sperm 
providers).  
  In a recent case, a sperm donor sought additional visitation rights beyond those 
to which he had previously agreed in writing.  In re Matter of William “TT” v. Siobhon 
“HH”, NYLJ, Oct. 2, 2000 (Albany Fam. Ct). The court awarded him additional rights 
because the children “were fortunate to have two biological parents [the mother and the 
father] who love and care for them.”  Courts have a tendency to try to find two parents of 
the opposite sex for children. See Naomi Cahn, Reframing Child Custody 
Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST . L.J. 1 (1997).   
7  See Polikoff, supra  note 5, at ____.   
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doubtful.8  Where there is an anonymous donor, on the other hand, given the 
collection practices of many sperm and egg banks, there may be little information 
available about the potential gamete provider.  There are a few sperm banks, such 
as the Rainbow Flag Health Services Bank, which recruits gay and bisexual 
sperm donors and calls itself  “A Known Sperm Bank.”9  But, as part of its 
services, it asks that the mother contact the sperm donor by the time the child 
turns one-year-old; such a requirement may be onerous and cause legal problems, 
however, particularly if the sperm donor seeks to establish a relationship with the 
child.10  Indeed, many sperm providers want to be involved with the resulting 
children.11  The Sperm Bank of California has a known donor/yes program 
through which donors agree to let any resulting children learn their identity when 
the children are eighteen years old.12   This allows couples (or a single parent) to 
raise a child together, without the specter of a man claiming paternal rights 
suddenly appearing.13 Similarly, Pacific Reproductive Services, which describes 
itself as “lesbian and single-women friendly,”14 indicates in its donor profiles 
whether the donor is willing to be known when the child turns eighteen, or at 
least allow the child to see a video of him.15  
 In the overwhelming majority of cases involving an unknown donor, 
when children begin searching for genetic information, they will be unable to 
receive any.  While some banks, such as the California Cryobank, allow for the 
                                                 
8  See Velte, supra note 4, at 445, 449; Martha A. McCarthy & Joanna L. Radbord, 
Family Law for Same Sex Couples: Chart(er)ing the Course, 15 CAN. J. FAM. L. 101, 
130, 131 n. 83 (1998).  
9Rainbow Flag Health Services, Known Donor Insemination at 
www.gayspermbank.com (last visited February 12, 2001). 
10  For example, the sperm provider may want to establish a relationship with the child. 
See Polikoff, Breaking the Link Between Biology and parental Rights in Planned 
Lesbian Families: When Semen Donors are Not Fathers, __ GEO. J. GENDER & L. __ 
(forthcoming 2000); 
11  See Tzivia Gover, Two Years and Counting: Sperm Banks Prepare to Face the Test 
of Time, in HOME FRONTS: CONTROVERSIES IN NONTRADITIONAL PARENTING 165, 172 
(Jess Wells ed., 2000) (“Director Leland Traiman’s one-man operation [Rainbow Sperm 
Bank] . . . collects sperm from donors–mostly gay men–who want to play an uncle-like 
role in their offspring’s life.”).  
12  See Susan Seligson, Seeds of Doubt: A Successful Donor-Insemination Service 
Catering to Heterosexual Single Women and Lesbians Raise Some Difficult Questions, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar., 1995, at 28.  “About 60 percent of the 3,000 or so vials of 
sperm released each year come from “Yes” donors.”  Id.  “Forty percent of the bank's 
donors sign up for the program.  Eighty percent of clients request one of them.”  20/20: 
Faceless, Nameless Fathers – Donor Offspring Seek Clues About Their Dads, (ABC 
television broadcast, Dec. 25, 1998).  
13  See Ilene Chaykin, Babes in Arms: Gay Parents Gain Acceptance, L.A. MAG, July 1, 
2000 at pg # (commenting on the choice of one lesbian couple to use this alternative).  
14 Donor Sperm, Donor Egg, Surrogacy & Embryo Adoption Resources, at 
http://www.fertilityplus.org/faq/donor.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2001). Offers "Willing-
to-be-Known" donors, and is billed as “Lesbian and single-women friendly.” 
15Pacific Reproductive Services, December 2000 Donor Catalogue, at 
http://www.hellobaby.com/profiles.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2001). All five donors in 
the December 2000 catalogue indicated a willingness to be known. 
 release of donor information with mutual consent,16 even this process is difficult, 
because it requires the Bank to find the sperm providers many years later.  A 
reporter who tried to track down California Cryobank Donor No. 5027, whose 
sperm resulted in children – one as young as two years old – was unable to find 
the Donor, even though the sperm providers are supposed to keep the bank 
apprised of their moves.17 This mutual consent process has proven quite difficult 
in the adoption context too because neither party may be aware of the other’s 
consent.18   
 In the remainder of this essay, I focus on the relationship between 
children, unknown donors, and biological parents.  My emphasis is on children 
and information, rather than on the possibility of birth parents or known gamete 
donors asserting parental rights.  In both known and unknown situations, I argue 
that children deserve access to information. Although I agree that once an 
adoption has been finalized or once known gamete donors have agreed not to 
assert parental rights, they should be unable to assert parental rights, the finality 
of adoption or gamete provision should not prevent the disclosure of information 
about the identity of biological parents and gamete providers to a mature child.19   
The disclosure of this information is not equivalent to recognizing parental rights 
and responsibilities for the biological parents. Nor is disclosure solely for 
genetically based reasons. Rather, disclosure recognizes the potential relationship 
between the child and her biological forebears.  
 The argument for disclosure, while it may implicate constitutional 
interests, is ultimately based on public policy considerations.20 Adoption and 
gamete provision are regulated by state and federal law, so the decisions on 
whether to allow disclosure is largely left to the legislative, or referenda21 
process.  In the adoption area, legislatures have chosen whether to seal birth 
certificates and related adoption records based on a balancing of the different 
interests involved.  In the gamete provision area, the few legislatures that have 
                                                 
16  The Bank’s “Openness Policy” emphasizes the importance of mutual consent before 
the release of any information. See California Cryobank, Inc., Openness Policy, at  
http://206.117.149.143/openness.cfm?page=3&sub=4 (last visited Feb. 21, 2001).  
17 Jonathan Eig, An American Family, OFFSPRING MAG., Dec./Jan. 2001, at 92. 
18  See Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case 
for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CON. L. 150 (1999).  
19  For a discussion of children’s maturity, see Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for 
Mature Minors to Receive Information, 2 U. PA.  CON. L.J. 223 (1999).  Children – 
particularly as they grow – may have interests that diverge profoundly from those of 
their parents.  See id. at 225. See generally, Cahn & Singer, supra  note 17; Emily Buss, 
What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. CON.L.J. 53 (1999).   
20  See Cahn & Singer, supra  note 17 (arguing that while the right to disclosure should, 
perhaps, be conceptualized as a fundamental right, it may not be so recognized under 
contemporary judicial formulations of constitutional law).  As Catherine Ross notes, the 
constitution does protect a right to information in other contexts.  See Ross, supra  note 
19, at 227-233.  The right to receive information, however, “remains a relatively 
unexplored aspect of freedom of speech even when adults assert such a claim.”  Id. at 
230. 
21  In Oregon, the decision to allow adoptees access to their birth certificates was 
accomplished through a public referendum. Cite 
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acted, have similarly attempted to balance the different interests involved.  My 
argument is that the balancing of the affected interests should result in making 
birth certificates readily available because the “child’s” interest becomes 
paramount when she becomes an adult.  
 
I.  INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND FAMILIAL INTERESTS 
 The needs experienced by adoptees and children of gamete provision for 
identifying information are often similar,22 as is the type of information sought.   
Adoptees generally seek access to their original birth certificates, which includes 
the names of their biological mother and perhaps, their biological father;23 
gamete offspring generally want identifying information about the gamete 
providers, which may also include names.  For instance, under the identity-
release policy of The Sperm Bank of California, the gamete offspring will 
receive the provider’s full name, driver’s license number, last known address and 
telephone number, and the date and place of the provider’s birth.24   
 While not all children will seek this information, it is important to many 
of them to be able to access it.25  Not providing this information treats these 
children differently from children in traditional nuclear families.  While non-
disclosure recognizes that one’s parents are the individuals who function as 
parents, it denies that these children may be interested in other adults who 
contributed to their creation.  Children want to know why they have a certain eye 
color, where their musical talent comes from, whose sense of humor they have.26  
In addition, non-disclosure implies that functional parents would be threatened if 
this additional information could be discovered, rather than recognizing the 
security and integrity of the functional parent/child bond.  The exploration of 
these issues specifically in the context of lesbian and gay families is a relatively 
new topic, and it is unclear whether children in these families will experience the 
desire for information in a manner that is comparable to other adoptees.  
Nonetheless, based on the limited information available, it appears that at least 
some adoptees and gamete-created children will want to find out the identity of 
their birth parents or gamete providers.27  This section discusses information 
issues in both adoptive and gametically formed families.   
                                                 
22   See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making:  An Interpretive Approach to 
the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 899 (2000). 
23  For a discussion of the issuance of new birth certificates upon adoption, see Joan 
Heifetz Hollinger, Aftermath of Adoption: Legal and Social Consequences, in 2 
ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE  13-1. (Joan Heifetz Hollinger, ed., 1998). 
24  The Sperm Bank of California Donor Insemination Services 6.  
25  See David Crary, Many Adoptees Seeking Open Birth Records, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE, Nov. 13, 2000, at P4C. 
26  See Nina Burleigh, Are You My Father?  Donor-Inseminated Children, 192 
REDBOOK, Mar. 1999, at #.  (discussing identity issues for children conceived through 
donor sperm). While not all of these questions are answered through meeting gamete 
providers or adoptive parents – does a sense of humor really come from biology? – 
these meetings can provide a sense of security, knowledge, and identity. 
27  See, e.g ., D. MERILEE CLUNIS & G. DORSEY GREEN, THE LESBIAN PARENTING 
BOOK: A GUIDE TO CREATING FAMILIES AND RAISING CHILDREN, 55 (1995). 
  
A.  ADOPTION 
 The issues of disclosure are perhaps easier to understand when it comes 
to adoption because the birth parents (or at least one of them) were involved for a 
longer period of time in the creation of the child than were the gamete providers.  
Consequently, the need expressed by adoptees to learn about their birth parents 
appears somewhat more comprehensible: there were people who explicitly 
relinquished their parental rights28 rather than simply providing (or selling) 
gametic material. 
 When children are adopted, they are issued new birth certificates with the 
names of their adoptive parent – or parents (when there are second-parent 
adoptions), rather than their biological parents. Most states currently have laws 
that allow adopted children to access  their original birth certificates after going 
to court and showing good cause, which has  generally been interpreted strictly.29   
However, even such limited access has not always been permitted. While Alaska 
and Kansas never sealed their records, most other states did so, beginning in the 
early 1900s.30  In the years surrounding World War II, most states began to deny 
adoptees access to their birth certificates.31  In fact,  in 1960, 60% of the states 
explicitly precluded adult adoptees from accessing their birth records.32  
Adoption professionals sought to prevent the stigma of illegitimacy from 
attaching to either the birth mother or the child,33 an ironic justification today 
given the status of LGBT families. Currently, only Oregon, Tennessee, 
Delaware, and a few other states, have laws that allow adoptees to obtain their 
                                                                                                                         
Felix’s moms had used sperm from an unknown donor . . .. Felix grew up 
simply knowing he had a biological father [sic] somewhere in the city and had 
not much bothered with that until he hit ten.  Then he became desperate to know 
who his “father” was and began to pester his moms about finding him.  When he 
found out they knew who he was, he wanted to meet him. 
The authors also point out that there has been no “definitive research” on the question of 
whether “alternatively inseminated children reared by lesbian mothers really miss having 
a father.”  Id. at 54. 
28  On the requirements that both biological parents relinquish their rights, see 
Hollinger, supra  note 24, at 13-1.  
29See id. A birth mother recently petitioned a court to allow her to convey medical 
information to her child about the predisposition of the biological parents to a variety of 
potentially treatable medical conditions pursuant to the “good cause” exception, and the 
court allowed her to proceed.  Matter of Baby Boy “SS” v. Rosemarie “TT”, discussed 
in John Caher, Court Backs Birth Mother’s Bid to Unseal Adoption Records, N.Y.L.J. 
(Jan. 5, 2001). 
30  See Elizabeth Samuels The Idea of Adoption: An Inquiry into the History of Adult 
Adoptee Access to Birth Records (manuscript at 5). 
31  See E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY 
OF ADOPTION (1998); see also   RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUZIE: SINGLE 
PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE (1992). 
32  See Samuels, supra  note 31, at 3. 
33  See Carp, supra  note 32. 
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records when they become adults without going to court.34  Thus, adoptees in 
these states have the same right as anyone else to obtain their original birth 
certificates.   
 Some adoption professionals think that adoptees benefit from openness.35  
It is important to distinguish two different meanings of the term openness.  
“Open adoption” refers to “adoption-with-contact” or an adoption with the 
potential for ongoing contact between the biological parent(s) and the adoptive 
parent(s).36   “Open records” refers to the disclosure of information to members 
of the adoption triad of records relating to the child’s birth and adoption.   Studies 
of adoptive parents, biological parents, and adoptees show strong support for 
allowing adoptees access to their birth certificates.37 
 Adult adoptees express health, medical and psychological reasons for 
wanting to know their birth parents.38 Genetic essentialism (biogenetic 
fundamentalism) is not an accurate label for their interests. Many are searching to 
fill in missing parts of their identity,39 for an explanation of why they were 
relinquished for adoption, or to reassure their birth parents that they are well.40  
Dissatisfaction with their adoptive lives rarely forms part of their motivation.41   
Like other adoptees, lesbian adoptees generally have a variety of reasons 
for searching for their birth mothers: 
Jill, a lesbian adoptee in her early twenties, believes that all female 
adoptees are looking for a mother . . .Theresa, who is also gay and in her 
twenties, says, “my emotional birth was when I met my mother and she 
                                                 
34  See Cahn & Singer, supra  note 17, at #.  New Zealand is considering legislation, 
which would provide for the issuance of two birth certificates upon adoption, one with 
the names of the birth parents, one with the names of the adoptive parents, and allow 
access to this information to all members of the adoption triad.  Mary Longmore, Gay 
Men Get Rights in Adoption Overhaul Plan, EVENING POST  (Wellington), Sept. 29, 
2000, at 3; see also  Law Commission, Adoption and Its Alternatives: A Different 
Approach and a New Framework  171-173 (Sept. 2000) at http://www.lawcom.govt.nz  
(last visited March 28, 2001). 
35   See generally Patrick McMahon, Adoptees Demand Right to Past, USA TODAY, 
June 25, 1999 at #; David Brodzinsky, et al., BEING ADOPTED: THE LIFELONG SEARCH 
FOR SELF (1993); David Brodzinsky, et al., THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION (1993); 
BETTY JEAN LIFTON, JOURNEY OF THE ADOPTED SELF: A QUEST FOR WHOLENESS 234 
(1994). 
36 See, e.g., Annette Appell, Increasing Options to Improve Permanency Considerations 
in Drafting an Adoption with Contact Statute, 18 CHILD. LEGAL RT . J. 24, 36-42 (1998). 
37  See, e.g., Hollinger, supra  note 24, at 13-38-39 (reporting on birth parents). 
38  Lisa Belkin, What the Jumans Didn’t Know About Michael, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 
1999, at 42 (providing a compelling account of one adoptee’s need to learn about his 
biological mother’s past). 
39  See, e.g ., Paul Sachdev, Adoption Reunion and After: A Study of the Search Process 
and Experience of Adoptees, 71 CHILD WELFARE 53, 58-59 (1992).  In this study of 124 
adoptees who had searched and found their biological parents, most adoptees explained 
that they were looking for a missing part of their lives to develop a “more cohesive 
identity.”  Id. at 58. 
40  See Sachdev, supra  note 42, at 59. 
41  See id.; see also Frances Pacheco & Robert Eme, An Outcome Study of the Reunion 
Between Adoptees and Biological Parents, 72 CHILD WELFARE 53, 58 (1993). 
 didn’t reject me.  It was the first day I felt like a human being.  Every 
other relationship I had fell off the face of the earth.”42   
 
B.  CHILDREN FORMED THROUGH GAMETE PROVISION 
 As in adoption, the question in gamete provision is: should a child ever 
be able to discover the identity of her gamete provider?43 For at least 100 years, 
women have become pregnant through insemination of donor sperm.44  The first 
known use of artificial insemination with donor sperm (AID) was performed in 
the United States in 1884, although some research suggests it occurred more than 
1600 years ago in parts of the Jewish Talmud.45 The donors are often promised 
anonymity by the sperm bank, clinic, or under state statute;46 but, of course, so 
were many biological parents of adoptees.  The standard for disclosure under the 
                                                 
42  See LIFTON, supra  note 37.  Surprisingly, there is comparatively little information on 
lesbian and gay adoptees and their biological parents.  The focus of much of the 
adoption literature within the lesbian and gay community is on the basic ability of 
LGBT parents to adopt in the first place. 
43  See Jeanne Marie Laskas, Left Unsaid, WASH. POST , Mar. 29, 1998, at W35 
(reporting on friend who had agreed never to tell anyone about an egg donation, and 
who then promptly told her friend, a journalist).  It may be difficult to keep the secret 
regardless of the parents’ intentions. Moreover, many children who do not look like 
their parents or any of their relatives guess that they are not biologically related to their 
fathers. 
In Sweden, children conceived after 1985 have the right to receive information about the 
identity of their sperm donors.  In a major study of whether parents told their children 
that they had been conceived in this manner, only 52% of the parents either had told, or 
intended to tell, their children this information.  Claes Gottlieb et al., Disclosure of Donor 
Insemination to the Child: The Impact of Swedish Legislation on Couples’ Attitudes, 15 
HUM. REP . 2052 (Sept. 2000). 
Elizabeth Gibson identifies two issues involved in the secrecy of artificial 
insemination:  who should be told about the fact of the sperm provider, and what should 
be told about the identity of the provider.  See Gibson, supra  note 45, at 3 
(recommending disclosure).   
44  Elizabeth L. Gibson, Artificial Insemination by Donor: Information, Communication 
and Regulation, 30 J. FAM. L. 1, 2 (1991-92). The use of “donor” in the gamete area is 
problematic.  Men who produce sperm are paid for their efforts, and while egg donors 
used to be relatives of the donee, egg donors are generally paid at least several thousand 
dollars today.  See Barbara Vobejda, Egg Donation: A Growing Business: Fertility 
Successes Raise Demand, WASH.  POST , March 7, 1999, at A1; Kathryn D. Katz, Ghost 
Mothers: Human Egg Donation and the Legacy of the Past, 57 ALB. L. REV. 733, 739 
(1994).  
45 Machelle M. Seibel, Therapeutic Donor Insemination, in FAMILY BUILDING, supra  
note 3, at 33-34.   
46  For example, the Uniform Parentage Act provides that all documents relating to an 
insemination are “subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good cause 
shown.”  Uniform Parentage Act § 5(a), 9b U.L.A.(1987); see CA. CODE 
§7613(a)(2001)(“good cause”); COL. REV. STAT . ANN. §19-4-107 (2000)(“good 
cause”); N.J. STAT . ANN. §9:17-44a (2000) (“compelling reasons clearly and 
convincingly shown”); O. REV.  STATE § 677.365  (1999)(“may be opened only upon an 
order of a court of competent jurisdiction”):  WYO. STAT . § 14-2-103(a)(2000)(“good 
cause). 
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Uniform Parentage Act of information concerning sperm donors is “good cause,” 
the same standard applicable in the adoption area.  However, some state 
legislatures have permitted disclosure of the identity of biological parents without 
the requirement of a court order. Courts have explained that the state is free to 
make this change based on public policy considerations.47   
 Because of the new reproductive technologies, women can donate eggs 
to other women or for surrogates. In 1996, there were more than 5,000 cases of 
egg donation.48 Egg donation provides a workable option for gay men who want 
to raise a child.  For example, Nadine Scott donated an egg to be carried by a 
surrogate mother on behalf of a gay male couple who had been trying to acquire 
children for more than nine years.49  There has been a proliferation of genetic and 
gestational arrangements,50 and an emergence of legal issues regarding access to 
information. 
 The issue of secrecy and gamete provision is highly problematic.  There 
are both similarities and differences to issues surrounding secrecy and adoption, 
and, there are a series of special issues for LGBT families.  The history of 
secrecy surrounding gamete provision is perhaps more complicated than that 
concerning adoption: sperm providers are often promised anonymity51 and may 
have relied on that promise in agreeing to provide sperm. Similarly, while the 
identity of egg providers was often well-known in early cases, there is now more 
anonymity and secrecy attached to this process as well.  Moreover, the intending 
parents in gamete provision cases have generally been subject to much less 
pressure to disclose the biological background of their children than have 
adoptive parents, who have been counseled to tell their children that they are 
adopted.    
   For the child, the interests in finding out more information about her 
gamete providers may be similar to those of adoptees’ needs for information.52    
Not all children will want access to this information, but many want to know 
where they came from.  Indeed, while the children may not want a long-term 
relationship with their gamete providers, many experience curiosity.53  One guide 
to lesbian parenting explains that children may “grieve never knowing their 
biological father.”54  The book encourages the mother(s) to “hang in there” while 
                                                 
47  See, e.g., Doe v. Sundquist,  2 S.W.3d 919 (Tenn. 1999) (“We have held, however, 
that the confidentiality of records is a statutory matter left to the legislature.”). 
48  Vobejda, supra  note 45, at A1(citing Centers for Disease Control statistics). 
49  Meghan Daum, Baby Gift, HARPER’S BAZAAR, Apr. 1, 2000, at  22. 
50  See Velte, supra  note 4. 
51  It appears that state law did not actually regulate this promise of nondisclosure; 
similarly, in the adoption context, state law never guaranteed complete anonymity to the 
biological parents.   
52  See Garrison, supra  note 13, at 899; Burleigh, supra note 27, at #.  (discussing 
identity issues for children conceived through donor sperm). 
53   Susan Kastner, How Do You Tell Kids “Daddy” is Donor Sperm? , TORONTO STAR, 
May 30, 1998, at pg. #. (discussing the difficulties faced by mothers and fathers dealing 
with children’s curiosity).  
54  See CLUNIS & GREEN, supra  note 28 at 55. 
 the child works through her feelings, and analogizes their situation to those in 
which children have lost a parent through divorce.55   
 Several studies have examined whether donor offspring experience 
identity problems that are similar to those of adopted children, and while the 
studies often conflict, they do indicate that at least some donor children 
experience a sense of loss for not having information about their biological pasts 
or being able to establish a relationship with their gamete providers.56 In fact, a 
number of groups are forming to work on the issues that the children and their 
parents confront.57 In one study of children who were not told until they were 
adults that they were born through donor insemination, the (now adult) children 
explained that they were experiencing problems of personal identity in 
conjunction with some hostility towards their families for not disclosing their 
origins.58   
 On the other hand, issues of “relinquishment” or “abandonment” seem 
far less complex because a child may find it easier to understand someone who 
simply provided sperm or eggs in exchange for money, rather having “given up” 
a baby for adoption.  Thus, “donor” children may face easier psychological issues 
surrounding their origins, and knowing the identity of their genetic parents may 
be less central to their sense of self.  Even these children, however, sometimes 
express strong interest in meeting their biological relatives.59  An article in 
Redbook  describes the search of one woman who tracked down her sperm 
provider father to the ob/gyn office where he practiced medicine.  He refused to 
talk about whether he might have provided the sperm.  But, she explained, “[I]t 
still bothers me. There are a lot of identity issues.  Who am I?  Who do I take 
after?”60  Another woman expressed uncertainty at what language to use to 
describe herself: “I’m unsure about what words to use.  Do we refer to ourselves 
as DI adoptees: do we say conceived or produced?  There is an element of being 
produced.”61  Some search crowds, looking for half-siblings, knowing that the 
same sperm donor could have helped in the birth of many children.62  
                                                 
55  Id. 
56  See A.J. Turner & A. Coyle, What Does it Mean to be a Donor Offspring?  The 
Identity Experience of Adults Conceived by Donor Insemination and the Implication for 
Counseling and Therapy, 15 HUM.  REP . 2041, 2050 (2000) (contrasting their study, 
which did find such psychological issues, with other studies that did not); Law 
Commission, Adoption and its Alternatives, supra  note __, at 210-11 (“It is too early to 
know whether the children born as a result of [donor insemination] will experience 
similar issues to adopted persons, although early research suggests that they might.”). 
57  See Celia Hall, Torment of Children with Donors for Fathers, DAILY TELEGRAPH, 
Aug. 31, 2000, at 5 (Donor Conception Network provides support for parents and some 
children); Roy Eccleston, Dear Dad (whoever you are . . . ), AUSTRALIAN MAG., Apr. 
19, 1998 at #(providing contact information for The Donor Conception Support Group 
of Australia).  
58  See id.  
59  See Laskas, supra  note 52, at W35; Vobejda, supra note 45, at A1. 
60  See Burleigh, supra  note 27, at #. 
61  See Eccleston, supra  note 59 at #. 
62  Mary Linton, Donor Offspring Believe They Have a Right to Know Their Biological 
Identity, TORONTO LIFE, Sept. 13, 2000, at #. 
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 Gamete donors also face highly complex issues.  Like birth parents after 
adoption, gamete donors lack a legal relationship with their “children.”63  Under 
the current system, sperm donors generally expect anonymity. Moreover, sperm 
donation is not a particularly complex process that requires intensive 
involvement from the provider, although many sperm banks require repeat visits 
over a substantial period of time to ensure the quality of the sperm.  While it has 
been assumed that sperm donors will have rela tively little interest in meeting the 
resulting children, this is not accurate, especially given the growing number of 
banks that do allow for identifiability of donors.  In a New Zealand study of 
thirty-nine sperm donors who had been guaranteed anonymity, almost two-thirds 
of the men were either “strongly interested” or “interested” in meeting children 
conceived with their sperm.64  Newspapers similarly report that some sperm 
providers are interested in meeting their “offspring.”65     
 For women who provide eggs, the process of egg extraction is far less 
burdensome and relationship-building than is the process of being pregnant and 
carrying a child for nine months. Nonetheless, some egg donors, who have 
undergone more invasive procedures may have forged a bond with the recipient 
family.66   Egg donors may even have contracts that require their permission for 
future disposition of the eggs.67 Thus, the initial presumption in the medical 
community that egg donation would be treated like sperm donation is somewhat 
more problematic in the context of egg donation, which began by using identified 
donors.  The identified donors were often related to the recipients, and programs 
referred to themselves as “BYOD,” which stood for “bring your own donor.”68  
                                                 
63  For a discussion of the curious and ambivalent legal relationships between adoptees 
and their biological parents, see Naomi Cahn, Thicker than What? (1999)  (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
64  Adair, supra  note 3 at 7. 
65  See Rita Rubin, Who’s My Father?  Progeny Seek Some Conception of Sperm 
Donors, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 2000, at 1D (one has even begun an e-mail list in the 
hope of meeting children created with his sperm); but see Hall, supra  note 59 
(describing support groups for parents and children who have little hope of meeting the 
sperm donor). 
66  Vobejda, supra  note 45, at A1; but see Lisa Belkin, Pregnant with Complications, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, at 34 (discussing the importance of egg donors not thinking 
about creating an “incipient person,” but thinking about their role as comparable to 
donating blood). 
67  See, e.g ., Litowitz v. Litowitz, 10 P.3d 1086 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000).  The contract 
provided:   
All  eggs  produced by the  Egg  Donor pursuant to this Agreement shall be 
deemed the property of the Intended Parents and as such, the Intended Parents 
shall have the sole right to determine the disposition of said egg (s). In no event 
may the Intended Parents allow any other party the use of said eggs without 
express written permission of the Egg Donor. 
Id. at 1093. 
68  Andrea Mechanik Braverman, Understanding the Disclosure/Non-Disclosure 
Decision in Donor Eggs, in THE ART OF DONOR OOCYTES pg. # (need editor 
names,1999). 
 As the use of egg donation has increased, however, anonymity has become a part 
of the process.69    
 For the intending parents, issues involving anonymity are quite complex.  
For example, Tzivia Gover explained her decision to mother a child that was 
biologically related to her partner and to a sperm donor. She said: 
 
When I was deciding to have a child in the ‘80s the idea of secrecy 
surrounding the donor suited me fine. . . . . As far as I was concerned, our 
child would have two parents, my partner and me–and that was that. 
 Now that my daughter is nearing 11, time and experience have 
complicated my vision of the donor’s role in her life, and I am relieved 
that we chose a route that will allow us to help point her in the right 
direction should she one day want to find him. 
 Still, I can’t help wonder at the plethora of options these days. If 
it is true that a donor is, as so many of us tell our children, just a nice 
man who donated his seed so we could start a family, would we really 
need to gather round the television set to watch him on video?. . . 
Although sperm bank personnel–and even most lesbian moms I’ve 
spoken with–say more information helps curb fantasies about a Donor 
Dad in Shining Armor, I wonder.70 
 
 Some intending mothers may choose to contact others who have used the 
same sperm provider, thus allowing children who are genetically related to meet 
each other, and providing some sort of extended family for both the parents and 
the children.  Indeed, after five women who used the same donor recently 
introduced themselves and their seven children to each other, their children asked 
if they would be able to see their “new relatives” again and the mothers liked 
“the idea of building a communal extended family.”71   
 As adoption law changes, so too may the laws surrounding the secrecy of 
gamete providers.72 I think it is easier to see the connection between a birth 
mother and her child than between gamete providers and their children. Birth 
mothers have begun to speak up about their strong interests in knowing their 
children, and their feelings of attachment, and they now have more control over 
the adoption process (rather than in bygone days when some women were even 
blindfolded in the birthing room to prevent the formation of any attachment).73  
In contrast, there has been no corresponding movement among gamete providers, 
reflecting, perhaps, their lack of emotional investment in their genetic 
contributions.  The casualness with which gamete providers go about their 
business is unsettling. While they should not be saddled with parental rights and 
obligations when they so clearly intend not to become parents and there are 
                                                 
69  See Seibel, supra  note __, at # (disclosure forms complete cite). 
  70  Gover, supra  note 10, at 174. 
71  See Eig, supra  note 16, at 97, 101. 
72  See Terri Finesmith Horwich, Legal Aspects of Egg Donation, in THE ART OF DONOR 
OOCYTES, supra note 34, at pg #. (need year and publisher) 
73  See SOLINGER, supra  note 32 at #.  
 14
others who so clearly intend to become parents, the “products”74 of their business 
may not see their creation in quite so businesslike a manner. Some participants of 
gamete provision have even attempted to engineer an absence of relationship 
between the gamete providers and the resulting child – some gay male couples, 
for example, have separate egg providers and surrogates to attenuate the 
connections with the resulting child – but this may not work for the child, the 
intending parent, or even for the gamete provider.  Based on current medical 
technology, an egg provider and the recipient must synchronize their 
reproductive schedules, a hormonally-intensive procedure.75   
 On the other hand, “open” gamete donation, where the providers and the 
intending parents are known and would like continued contact, remains an 
option.  For instance, both Nadine Scott, the egg provider, and the surrogate, 
have become friendly with the gay male couple who are the intending parents, 
and the couple has encouraged Ms. Scott to be as involved as she chooses.76  This 
parallels developments in the adoption context, where adoption-with-contact has 
become an increasingly popular option.77    
 Finally, the issues of state involvement in gamete provision differ.  Only 
nine states currently protect the anonymity of gamete donors,78 while virtually all 
states protect the secrecy of biological parents.79  Adoption is also a state-created 
legal process, while gamete donation remains a largely private transaction that is 
handled through contract and intention80 with virtually no uniform regulation.81   
                                                 
74  See infra nn. __ for further discussion of the concept of  “products.”  
75  See Monica Muzzi, Synchronization of Donor and Recipient Cycles, in THE ART OF 
DONOR OOCYTES, pg. # [and need year]  (“The challenge of optimizing egg donor 
outcome entails synchronization.”). 
76  See Daum, supra  note 50, at 22. Although this article focuses on families formed 
through adoption or gamete provision, the same disclosure issues arise in the context of 
surrogacy.  Without addressing more generally the desirability or legality of surrogacy, 
I believe that children of surrogates should have access to the same information as 
adoptees or gamete offspring.   
77  See, e.g ., Appell, supra  note 38; see also  Annette Appell, Enforceable Post-Adoption 
Contact Statutes, Part I: Adoption with Contact, 4 ADOPTION Q. 81 (2000). 
78  Source. 
79  See Carp, supra  note 32, at #; Hollinger, supra note 24, at #. 
80  See Katz, supra  note 21, at 774.  Professor Katz proposes that children of gamete 
donors receive identifying information; she argues that “gamete donors [who] are 
unwilling to have their sons and daughters meet them face to face one day should not 
participate in the creation of children.”  Id. at 780.  
81  See Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Adoption, Reproductive Technologies, and 
Genetic Information, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 125, 138 (1998) (eighteen states have enacted 
statutes that allow children conceived through sperm provision to obtain information if 
they can show “good cause” to do so); see also  Rick Weiss, Babies in Limbo: Laws 
Outpaced by Fertility Advances; Multiple Parties to Conception Muddle Issues of 
Parentage, WASH. POST , Feb. 8, 1998, at A1 (listing hodge-podge of state laws). 
 While at least thirty-five states have enacted legislation regulating parenthood in 
the context of artificial insemination by donor, only five states have enacted legislation 
defining parental rights in the context of egg provision.  Andrews & Elster, Regulating 
Reproductive Technologies, supra  note [this one is not cited previously. we need a cite 
for it] , at 48. 
 The anonymity of gamete donors is more likely to be protected through private 
contracts.  State-imposed disclosure requirements that impair these contracts may 
raise additional legal issues.  States have just begun to think about issues 
involving egg provision because the process is so new.82 Few states, however, 
have addressed issues regarding the rights and responsibilities of egg providers.83  
On the other hand, thirty-five states have at least partially addressed the parental 
rights and responsibilities where gamete provision is involved.84  For example, 
the Uniform Parentage Act, which has been adopted by 19 states, provides: “If, 
under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her 
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her 
husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child 
thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing and signed by him 
and his wife.”85  Obviously, donor insemination of any woman not married to a 
“husband” is left  uncovered by this law.86  
 
II.  DISCLOSURE AND LGBT FAMILIES 
 There are some issues specific to same-sex relationships that make 
disclosure of gamete donation very different from the situation opposite-sex 
couples face, and suggest that disclosure of a child’s biological origins may not 
be as divisive an issue within the community or for individual parents.  First, 
when children learn that men make sperm and women make eggs, they realize 
that two men or two women (or a single woman or a single man) cannot make a 
baby themselves.87 Thus, given that the initial secrecy over the process itself is 
already dissolved,88 that makes it easier for children to ask questions about the 
identity of the gamete provider.  In addition, one study of lesbian couples and 
single women using donor insemination found that all of the women intended to 
tell their children their status, and that 57% wanted either to meet with donor 
themselves or have their child meet the donor.89  Moreover, unlike the situation 
of many heterosexual parents, lesbian and gay parents must generally engage in 
                                                 
82  See, e.g ., Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: 
Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REV. 265 (1995).  
83  See John A. Robertson & Susan L. Crockin, Legal Issues in Egg Donation, in 
FORMING FAMILIES, supra  note __, at 144, 145. (No previous cite – need full cite)  Add 
additional support. 
84  See Polikoff, manuscript at 8 n. 29.  Most of these statutes address situations 
involving the obligations of married parents and unknown donors.   
85  See UPA Sec. 5 at  http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.html (last visited 
March 28, 2001). 
86  See Polikoff, supra note __, at 9. 
87  See Shanley, supra note 5, at #.  
88  See Susan C. Klock, The Controversy Surrounding Privacy or Disclosure Among 
Donor Gamete Recipients, 14 J. ASSISTED REPROD. & GENETICS 378, 379 (1997) 
(“Data regarding single women and lesbian couples who have children via DI indicate 
that virtually 100% of these parents will tell the child that he/she was conceived via 
DI.”). 
89 Joanna E. Scheib et al., Choosing Between Anonymous and Identity-Release Sperm 
Donors: Recipient and Donor Characteristics, 10 REPROD. TECH. 50, 51 (2000) 
(reporting on study by Leiblum). 
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extensive planning before they are able to acquire children.90  Given that their 
families already differ from the generic heterosexual nuclear family, lesbian and 
gay parents may find it easier to disclose not just the fact of gamete provision but 
also the identity of the provider.  In its study of sperm sample recipients, the 
Sperm Bank of California found that many women used its identity release 
program to make their children’s lives easier with respect to their identity issues 
and the situation of having two mothers.91  The mothers wanted their children to 
have the option of learning this information.  
secrecy is not a viable option in these cases.  
 Interestingly enough, women are more likely to disclose than are men, 
regardless of what type of gamete has been provided.92  One mother, counseled 
not to disclose that her child was the result of sperm provision, asserts that the 
secrecy norm is “‘the work of male doctors colluding with infertile males to 
protect male donors.’”93  Indeed, one physician recently explained: “Anonymity 
is a tool that protects the social and psychological construct of the family 
resulting from gamete donation, especially enhancing the social paternal role of 
the male in the recipient couples in the case of sperm donation.”94 
 By contrast, for opposite-sex intending parents, there may be even more 
secrecy surrounding gamete donation than adoption.  While many heterosexual 
parents disclose that their children are adopted, parents are much less likely to 
disclose, first, that their children were conceived through gamete donation, and 
second, any information about the gamete provider.   Physicians involved in the 
gamete donation process believe that many parents do not plan to tell their 
children that they are not biologically related to both parents.95 In a recent study 
of parents who conceived children through gamete donation, more than one-half 
of the parents surveyed did not intend to disclose this information to their 
children, while slightly more than one-third expected to do so.96  Similarly, 
                                                 
90  See Ilene Chaykin, Babes in Arms: Gay Parents Gain Acceptance, L.A. MAG., July 
1, 2000, at 45 (“unlike the occasional surprises that can lead to heterosexual conception, 
there are no accidents in gay and lesbian families”). 
91  6 The Sperm Bank of California  (reporting on study published in Reproductive 
Technologies).  See Scheib, supra  note 101, at 50. 
92  Braverman, supra  note 72, at #. 
93  Kastner, supra  note 55, at # (quoting the founder of Canada’s first support group for 
parents who have used sperm providers).  
94 F. Shenfield, Privacy Versus Disclosure in Gamete Donation: A Clash of Interest, of 
Duties, or an Exercise in Responsibility?, 14 J. ASSISTED REPROD. AND GENETICS 371, 
372 (1997).  For comparable arguments about the institution of marriage, see Ann 
Shalleck, Foundational Myths and the Reality of Dependency: The Role of Marriage, 8 
AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 197, 202 (2000). 
95  See John Geddes, Making Babies, MACLEAN'S, Dec. 6, 1999, at 53; Leslie Brody, 
That Old Facts of Life Talk Won't Do for Children Born of Technology, HOUS. CHRON., 
Nov. 24, 1998, at 2 (“Infertility specialists and therapists estimate 30 percent to 75 
percent of persons using donor eggs plan to tell the children; they speculate only about 
20 percent or 25 percent of those using donor sperm will tell.”); see also  Laskas, supra  
note 52, at W35; Burleigh, supra note 27, at #. 
96   See Richard D. Nachtigall et al., Stigma, Disclosure, and Family Functioning 
Among Parents of Children Conceived Through Donor Insemination, 68 FERTILITY AND 
 another study that surveyed the attitudes of reproductive endocrinologists found 
that 56% of the doctors did not believe that children should be informed of their 
biological origins.97  The secrecy often stems from efforts to protect family 
members from the stigma of male infertility and the general difficulty of 
discussing sperm itself, although there are additional explanations for the secrecy 
as well.98    
 Another issue unique to children born into a same-sex family deals with 
the fact that their families are non-traditional.  The concept that the gamete donor 
might be important to the child could seem to be an attempt to reify the opposite-
sex family; a child's family is not really complete unless she has not just two 
moms (or two dads) but also a "parent" of the opposite sex from her parents.  
However, some dangers of disclosure exist for same-sex couples that are not 
relevant for opposite-sex couples. For example, if a lesbian couple uses a non-
gay identified sperm provider, the provider may be homophobic.99   Other 
significant issues surrounding the concept of revealing the donor's identity 
concern fears that this is an attempt to assimilate the family into the stereotypical 
nuclear family.  This is part of what happens when courts award visitation or 
paternal rights to men who have donated sperm and explicitly agreed not to seek 
further contact with the child — courts are saying that each child needs a mom 
and a dad, at the least.100  
 
III.  GENETIC ESSENTIALISM  
 Focusing on biological identity raises the danger of genetic essentialism, 
or genetic determinism, a concept which suggests that a person is merely the sum 
of her genes, and behavior can be predicted based on genetic information.101  As 
Professor Dorothy Nelkin and Susan Lindee explain, “DNA in popular culture 
functions, in many respects, as a secular equivalent of the Christian soul . . 
                                                                                                                         
STERILITY 83 (1997).  Indeed, Fairfax Cryobank reports that 80% of married couples 
want a donor who resembles the husband.   Leslie Milk, Looking for Mr. Good Genes, 
WASHINGTONIAN, May 1999, at 65.   While this does not necessarily indicate that there 
will be no disclosure, it certainly facilitates non-disclosure because a child will be less 
likely to ask questions.  
97  S.R. Leiblum & S.E. Hamkin, To Tell or Not to Tell: Attitudes of Reproductive 
Endocrinologists Concerning Disclosure of DI to Offspring, 13 PSYCHOSOMATIC 
OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 267 (1992); see also  Milk, supra  note 93, at # (“Many 
physicians advise couples never to reveal the circumstances of their children’s 
conception.”). 
98See Turner & Coyle, supra  note 58, at 2042; Elizabeth L. Gibson, Artificial 
Insemination by Donor: Information, Communication and Regulation, 30 J. FAM. L. 1, 
7-12 (1991-92)(protect children); Burleigh, supra  note 27; Nachtigall, supra  note 93 at 
#. 
99  See Milk, supra  note 93, at # (noting this concern for one lesbian couple). 
100  See also  Ruthann Robson, Third Parties and the Third Sex: Child Custody and 
Lesbian Legal Theory, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1408 (1994) (“In arguing that their 
status as sperm donors entitled them to the privilege of parenthood, [plaintiffs] relied 
upon dyadic notions of parenthood, which would . . . install themselves within the 
requisite heterosexually composed dyadic formation that is parenthood.”). 
101  Id. at 320-321.  
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Fundamental to identity, DNA seems to explain individual differences, moral 
order, and human fate . . . relevant to the problems of personal authenticity.”102  
The gene has been seen as the “unifying concept” of the field of biology, with a 
virtually “iconic status” that makes it capable of explaining us to ourselves.103 
Critics have accused open records advocates of endorsing such essentialism and 
of asserting that blood kinship is superior to adoptive relationships.104     
 Although I advocate the disclosure of the biological parents’ identity, I 
do not justify it because of the genetic information that it will provide.105  Genetic 
information, while potentially helpful, does not reveal everything about a 
person’s identity.  What this information can do, however, is aid children who 
feel a connection to a biological past.  
 The mere knowledge of one’s genetic information is not, by itself, 
determinative of one’s identity, or even of one’s physical reality.  “Genes play 
some role in all disease, but environment plays a role as well, even with genetic 
diseases.”106  Knowing that a parent has developed cancer, heart disease, or 
depression does not definitively indicate that the child will also.107  Genes do not 
tell us about a person’s culture, family, friends, or moral beliefs.108  Acquiring 
genetic information does not allow an adoptee or a child of gamete provision to 
predict, or even to explain, all of her personal characteristics and traits.  For 
example, studies of adoptees whose biological parents were alcoholics shows a 
much higher than normal risk that the adopted children will also become 
alcoholics.109  On the other hand, 82% of these children did not become 
alcoholics. Moreover, studies of female adoptees of alcoholic birth parents do not 
indicate the same pattern.110  Genes are complex and can only be understood in a 
larger biological and social context.111  Nonetheless, a genetic history does 
contain useful information about potential medical conditions, and it may provide 
                                                 
102  DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A 
CULTURAL ICON,  2 (1995). 
103  See Anne Magurran, Backseat Drivers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, at 26 (reviewing 
Evelyn Fox Keller, The Century of the Gene (2000)). 
104  See Carp, supra  note 32, at 229 (“One of the central tenets of the [Adoption Rights 
Movement]’s ideology rests on the superiority of blood ties and the denigration of 
adoptive kinship.”); ELIZABETH BARTHOLET , FAMILY BONDS 59 (1993) (add 
parenthetical).  See also  Nelkin & Lindee, supra  note 108, at 70 (“The preoccupation 
with genetic relationships can stigmatize the experience of adoption.”)  
105  See also  Andrews & Elster, supra  note 42, at 150-51 (opposing the release of the 
identity of biological parents for the sole purpose of allowing adoptees to obtain current 
genetic information).  
106  Sonia Suter, draft at 13.  
107  See id. at 17. 
108  See id. at 21. 
109  RUTH HUBBARD & ELIJAH WALD, EXPLODING THE GENE MYTH: HOW GENETIC 
INFORMATION IS PRODUCED AND MANIPULATED BY SCIENTISTS, PHYSICIANS, 
EMPLOYERS, INSURANCE COMPANIES, EDUCATORS, AND LAW ENFORCERS, 100 (1993). 
110  Id. at 101. 
111  See Suter, supra  note __; EVELYN FOX KELLER, THE CENTURY OF THE GENE (2000) 
page #. 
 some grounding for those children who want to know, helping them shape future 
behavior.  
 Wanting to know about one’s genetic history does not, then, mean that 
every aspect of one’s life will suddenly be explained.  Instead, having the same 
genetic heritage creates the opportunity for a connection between parent and 
adult child that the state must not foreclose.  As Professor James Nelson points 
out, “Why . . . regard a biological connection to the future as a vital part of the 
identity of adults, but not see biological connectedness to the past as an equally 
vital part of the identity of children?”112  Given the importance to many parents 
of having a genetic connection to their child, it should be unremarkable that 
children are themselves interested in learning about those to whom they have a 
genetic connection.  In the case of gamete provision, where couples establish a 
genetic attachment between one of them and a child, it should not be surprising 
that children would want to know about other aspects of their genetic heritage. 
 If finding genetic information was the primary motivation for searching, 
then adoptees would seek equally both birth parents; in fact, however, adoptees 
are generally more interested in finding their birth mothers.113  Thus, genetics 
provides only a partial explanation for the search process.   
 It is ironic that adoption law increasingly mandates extensive disclosure 
of non-identifying medical and related information but has largely ignored the 
calls for disclosure of identifying  information.  State statutes are quite broad in 
the type of information that must be disclosed in connection with an adoption.114  
Similarly, the forms gamete providers must fill out are extremely detailed with 
respect to their family health histories, and much of this information is disclosed 
to potential recipients.  Sperm providers frequently undergo extensive screening 
as well as a complete physical examination.115 Recipients can choose egg or 
sperm providers based on specified number of traits.  For example, it is possible 
to choose race, ethnic ancestry, height, weight, physical build, hand coordination, 
vision, approximate IQ score, and college grade point average for egg 
providers.116  Cryogenic Laboratories offers the following: “Simply send us a 
photo of the individual you would hope for your offspring to resemble.  Our staff 
                                                 
112  James Lindemann Nelson, Cloning, Families, and the Reproduction of Persons, 32 
VAL. U.L. REV. 715, 719 (1998); see also  Joan H. Hollinger, From Coitus to 
Commerce: Legal and Social Consequences of Noncoital Reproduction, 18 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM. 865, 874 (1985) ("Much of this demand [for noncoital reproduction] 
follows from the social and psychological importance people attach to the ideal of 
having children who are genetically theirs."). 
113  See Sachdev, supra  note 41, at 58 (only 20% of adoptees ever thought about their 
birth fathers); cf. Pacheco and Eme, supra  note 43, at 59 (less than half of the adoptees 
interviewed who had not found their biological fathers were interested in doing so).  
114  See, e.g ., MADELYN FREUNDLICH & LISA PETERSON, WRONGFUL ADOPTION: LAW, 
POLICY, & PRACTICE  36-37 (1998)(providing sample statutes). 
115See The Sperm Bank of California, at http://thespermbankofca.org/screenng.html (last 
visited March 28, 2001); Sperm Donor Information, at 
http://206.117.149.143/donorinfo.cfm?page=3&sub=4 (last visited March 28, 2001).   
116See Creating Families, Inc., at 
http://www.eggdonorfertilitybank.com/profiles/search.html (last visited March 28, 
2001).  
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will then rank the resemblance of the donors you’ve selected.”117  The bank may 
even collect an audiotape of the providers.118 
 This full disclosure of anonymous information at the time of gamete 
provision – information that goes well beyond simple genes – along with 
corresponding secrecy of the identity of the person to whom the information 
corresponds, seems itself to be a potential example of genetic essentialism on 
behalf of the intending parents.  They do not want to know the actual person; 
they simply want to know her/his genes and a great deal of other information as 
well.  A primary rationale for requiring disclosure of non-identifying genetic 
information is to allow prospective adoptive parents or gamete recipients to 
guard against any dangers that might be posed through “faulty” genes.  As a 
secondary rationale, sperm banks report that many of their clients are looking for 
a good genetic match: “Sperm banks have found that most of their clients seek 
donors who share their ethnic background and personal interests.”119   In a recent 
HBO television program, Ellen DeGeneres expresses frustration with the process 
of seeking a sperm donor who looks like her.120  Indeed, lesbian couples seem to 
be as interested as heterosexual couples in attempting to match the sperm 
provider’s characteristics with those of the non-biologically-related partner.121  
By contrast, the purpose of disclosing the identity of biological relatives is to aid 
the adoptees and the various parents in their personal and emotional 
development, not solely to provide genetic information (although this may be an 
important by-product).122  Indeed, a birth mother recently petitioned a court so 
that she inform the adoptive family of various predispositions towards medical 
conditions.123 
 Ultimately, the reasons that adoptees or gamete children seek 
information goes far beyond genetically-related rationales.   The information 
provides additional background to their full identities –genetic, emotional, and 
even cultural.  Regardless of how happy children are, and have been, in their 
                                                 
117  See Cryogenic Laboratories, Inc., at http://www.cryolab.com (last visited March 28, 
2001).  
118See Eig, supra  note 16 (noting that the donor submitted a tape recording that included 
much of the information provided in writing) at 
http://206.117.149.143/profiles.cfm?toppage=3 (Reporting that the California Cryobank 
has audio tapes for many of its providers). 
119See Milk, supra  note 93, at 65.  Until the widespread use of sperm banks, physicians 
performing AID matched the recipients and the providers.  See also  Seibel, 
THERAPEUTIC DONOR INSEMINATION, supra  note 22, at 37. (parenthetical).  
120 IF THESE WALLS COULD TALK 2 (HBO television broadcast, Mar. 5, 2000). 
121  See Scheib, supra  note 101, at 56-57.  The authors of this study speculate that 
matching helps lesbian couples because: 
matching the donor to one’s partner may increase the non-genetic parent’s 
involvement with the DI process, the recipient’s pregnancy, and eventually the 
child . . .it may be especially important to lesbian couple, in which the non-
genetic mother’s role as a parent may be repeatedly questioned by some 
segments of society . . .. Id. at 57. 
122  The information available at the time of adoption or gamete provision will also be 
outdated by the time the offspring reaches adulthood.  
123  See Baby Boy SS, supra note __. 
 families, they still may want and need additional information.  Adoptees who 
have searched and found their birth mothers generally report a more positive self-
perception together with a more holistic sense of identity.124    
 
IV.  PRIVACY INTERESTS 
 The primary arguments against information disclosure center on the 
privacy rights of everyone involved: the adoptive parents, the biological parents, 
the gamete providers, and the child.  Elsewhere, I have extensively analyzed 
these rights,125 so I will simply provide a brief summary.  The argument against 
providing identifying information relies, in large part, on the history of 
nondisclosure, and on the use of nondisclosure to protect the interests of all 
involved in the process.  For example, Jeremiah Gutman, who has represented 
birth mothers and is the former chair of the American Civil Liberties Union’s 
privacy committee, argues that if birth mothers “cannot rely upon the adoption 
agency or attorney and the law to protect her privacy, and to conceal her identity 
for all time,” she may decide not to place a child for adoption.126   
 First, the history of secrecy in adoption provides contrary evidence 
concerning the need to protect the privacy of all members of the adoption triad.  
Records were originally sealed in order to prevent a prying public from receiving 
information about a child’s legitimacy, not to prevent members of the adoption 
triad from getting information about each other.127  Moreover, the only two states 
that do not seal their adoption records have lower abortion rates and higher 
adoption rates than the national average.128    
 Second, the traditional articulation of the fundamental right to privacy 
does not comprehend the various interests at stake in the adoption cases.  The 
cases’ discussion of personhood and privacy provide conflicting notions of 
whose rights and interests merit protection at any one time.129  The whole notion 
of privacy – the right to be let alone – has developed as protection for individuals 
from state interference; because adoption is a state-created status involving 
relationship within and between families, the traditional formulation of the 
doctrine is problematic.  For gamete and egg donors, the privacy interests should 
be analyzed in a similar fashion,130 that is, with a recognition that the state has 
been – or should be – involved in defining their status as parents or as non-
parents as well as the secrecy of their identities. 
                                                 
124  Ulrich Mueller, need title , 3 ADOPTION Q. 99, 99 (1999) (reviewing Need 
Explanatory Parenthetical). 
125  See Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case 
for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CON. L. 150 (1999).  This discussion is drawn 
from that article. 
126  Ira Carnahan, The Rise of “Bastard Nation”; And the Threat to Adoption, WEEKLY 
STANDARD, Sept. 11, 2000, at 22 (quoting Gutman); Susan Forrest, Adopted & Kept in 
Dark , DAILY NEWS, Jan. 4, 2000, at A1. 
127  See Carp, supra  note 32, at #. 
128  See Cahn & Singer, supra note __. 
129  For a discussion of the relevant cases, see Cahn & Singer, supra note __; Samuels, 
supra note __. 
130  See also  Garrison, supra  note 13, at 899-900 (parenthetical). 
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 The term “privacy” includes a series of different  “rights,” some of which 
have been recognized by the federal constitution, some of which have developed 
in other contexts.131  In his new book, Jeffrey Rosen argues that in the 
reproductive rights area, the Supreme Court has labeled as privacy what is better 
conceived of as an individual’s right to make reproductive decisions, in contrast 
to a “more focused vision of privacy that has to do with our ability to control the 
conditions under which we make different aspects of ourselves accessible to 
others.”132  Disclosure of the identity of sperm and egg providers implicates both 
aspects of “privacy,” the interests of the ultimate parent(s) in making intimate 
reproductive choices, and the interests of the gamete providers in controlling the 
circumstances under which they become – or do not become – known.  In 
addition, disclosure implicates a third kind of privacy, the interests of the child in 
the choice of whether to learn more about herself.133 
 Some birth parent advocates have analogized the adoption/gamete 
provision decision to that made by women choosing to undergo an abortion, 
claiming the same right to privacy protects both.134  The argument is that there is 
a fundamental right to make decisions regarding reproductive choices without 
intervention. 
 This argument works very well in the abortion context, when a woman is 
deciding what to do with her own body.  It works much less well when, after a 
woman or a man has decided what to do with her or his body, there is now a 
child with separate and independent needs and interests who is deciding what to 
do with her body.  Children have independently recognized rights that exist apart 
from, and sometimes in conflict with, those of their (different sets of) parents.135 
                                                 
131  See Naomi Cahn,  Models of Family  Privacy,   67 GEO.  WASH. L. REV. 1225 
(1999);  Martha  Albertson  Fineman,  What Place for Family  Privacy?, 67 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1210 (1999).  Professor Rhadika Rao has recently suggested that 
the concepts of privacy and property, while safeguarding different interests, may 
become “confused with one another.”  Rhadika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human 
Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 443 (2000).  She argues that privacy protects a person’s 
identity, while property “protects the autonomy of an owner over the object of 
ownership.”  Id. at 444.  
132  JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE:  THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN 
AMERICA 15 (2000). 
133  To use Professor Rosen’s language, it implicates the situations under which “we 
make different aspects of ourselves accessible to” ourselves.  This echoes an earlier 
concept that was also claimed to be a form of privacy, the “right to personhood.”  This 
shows the amorphous nature of privacy, the need to use a term with constitutional 
dimensions to cover a broad range of situations that have little in common.  
 This third type of privacy could also be called a right to self-expression, to 
individual fulfillment.  Cf. Robert Tuttle, Reviving Privacy, __ Geo. Wash. L. Rev. __ 
(1999)(questioning whether self-expression is an ultimate good). 
134  Find in Doe v. Sundquist briefs;  
135  See, e.g ., Ross, supra note __; Buss, supra note __;  
  In one of the first cases to deal with the disclosure of the identity of a 
sperm donor, the court crafted a compromise.136   The parents of an 11-year-old 
girl with a rare kidney disorder sued California Cryobank, which the parents 
allege provided them with the defective sperm that lead to the kidney disease.  As 
part of their suit, the Johnsons sought to depose the donor himself, who has 
resisted, claiming that disclosure would infringe his privacy interests. The 
donor’s  privacy claims were grounded in the contract between the Johnsons and 
Cryobank, which states that his identity will not be disclosed, as well as in the 
California and federal constitutions.137  The court held that the absolute 
prohibition in the contract was contrary to public policy, which allowed for 
disclosure based upon “good cause,” and although the court recognized a limited 
constitutional right to privacy under the California constitution, it held that the 
identity could be disclosed.  Given the particular circumstances of the case, 
however, the court directed that the donor be deposed without ever revealing his 
identity. 
 The analogies between the donor’s claim to privacy and those claims 
asserted in the adoption context are quite strong.  In both cases, there is a claim 
of a promise of confidentiality, and there is a claim that disclosing information 
violates privacy interests.  With both cases, state statutes have typically specified 
that disclosure is available upon a showing of “good cause,” and ultimately, 
courts have decided that good cause can sometimes trump these privacy interests.  
  In this country, a provider’s privacy claims are generally based on 
promises made in connection with a sale.  There are actually two sales 
transactions: a sperm bank typically pays $50 for each ejaculation,138 and, in turn, 
sells that sperm to the intending parents.139  A woman can sell her eggs to an in 
vitro fertilization program for $2500-5000, although some programs offer much 
more money.140 By allowing the sale of sperm and eggs, we are, in a sense, 
treating them and their ultimate “product” as a commodity.141  The Johnson court 
                                                 
136  See Johnson v. Superior Court, 80 Cal. App. 4th 1050, rev. denied, 2000 Cal. 
LEXIS 6741 (2000); see also David Kravets, Court Limits Sperm Donors’ Rights, AP 
ONLINE, Aug. 24, 2000. 
137 The contract between the provider and the Cryobank provided for confidentiality 
“‘unless a court orders disclosure for good cause.’” 80 Cal. App. 4th at 1057.  The 
contract between the sperm recipients and the Cryobank stated that the Johnsons would 
“‘not now, nor at any time, require nor expect [Cryobank] to obtain or divulge . . . the 
name of said donor, nor any other information concerning characteristics, qualities, or 
any other information whatsoever concerning said donor’ . . .  ‘ it being the intention of 
all parties that the identity of said donor shall be and forever remain anonymous.’” Id. at 
1064-65.  
138  See Eig, supra  note 16, at 97; Rubin, supra  note __ (at least one bank pays a 
premium for providers with a doctorate). 
139  See The Sperm Bank of California, at http://thespermbankofca.org/fees96.html (last 
visited 1/3/01); California Cryobank, Service and Fee Schedule, at 
http://206.117.149.143/fees.cfm?page=5&sub=20 (last visited Apr. 24, 2001). 
140  Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Financial 
Incentives in Recruitment of Oocyte Donors, 74 FERT . AND STER. 216, 216 (2000). 
141  See MARGARET RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 15 (1996); Margaret Jane Radin, 
Market Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).   
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rejected the donor’s claim to a physician-patient privilege because there was no 
evidence that the donor ever consulted the Cryobank for medical diagnosis and 
treatment; the donor instead sought merely to make money from the sale of his 
sperm and was thus not subject to the protections offered by the privilege.  Sale 
of the good did not subject him to the same privacy rights. While we might think 
differently about privacy in connection with a sale of “goods” than in connection 
with a sale of “personhood,”142 treating sperm and eggs as the sale of goods 
might help allay concerns about the identity of the providers.  This is an example 
of how the concept of commodification may be useful because it allows us to 
separate out the “good” from the privacy interests of the provider.  If we view 
gametes as commodities, this should diminish privacy concerns.  And, the mere 
ascription of financial value to these items, the mere use of commodification 
discourse, does not necessarily destroy all other values that they may contain.143  
The Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine has 
defended payment for eggs, explaining that payment does not discourage the 
provider’s altruistic motivations and also promotes fairness to the providers144       
 Of course, even as we permit eggs and sperm to be sold, there remain 
additional  concerns about the “purveyors” of these goods as well as the 
underlying validity of permitting sale of these “goods.”  Just as in the surrogacy 
context, the providers may be devaluing themselves145 (as well as their 
commodities).  Not allowing sperm and eggs to be sold might be the appropriate 
response that prevents exploitation and also acknowledges the significance of 
providing gametes.  While commodification may be useful conceptually in 
allaying privacy concerns, I remain concerned about allowing the sale of these 
particular commodities.  Removing the financial incentive might cause donors to 
understand the significance of their actions to their “offspring.”    
 As a policy matter, is this type of transaction entitled to secrecy?  
Perhaps the answer is yes, except to all of those involved in the transaction itself: 
the bank, the intending parents, and the child.  Just as the initial move to secrecy 
in adoption records was not designed to protect against disclosure within the 
relationship, the protection accorded to gamete donors should not extend to 
disclosure to anyone not directly involved in the “transaction.” The information 
could remain private, a secret shared only by the child, her parents, and the 
                                                                                                                         
For arguments that sale of gametic material should be more closely analogized to organ 
donation than blood donation, see Schiff, supra note __, at 292. 
142  See Rao, supra  note __, at 456-58.  Professor Rao suggests that the right of privacy 
protects individuals’ relationship to their frozen embryos where the individuals attempt 
to establish a personal relationship with the embryos, while the law of property applies 
more appropriately where individuals want to sell frozen embryos because they have no 
personal relationship to the embryos.  Id. at 458.  
143  See VIVIANA ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1994); Naomi Cahn, The 
Coin of the Realm: Poverty and the Commodification of Gendered Labor, _ IOWA J. 
GENDER, RACE & J. (forthcoming 2001). 
144  Ethics Committee Report, supra note __, at 218. 
145  See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 63 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 623, 679-680 (1991); Schiff, supra  note __, at 292-93; Anita Allen, the Black 
Surrogate Mother what is the rest of this cite?; Lori B. Andrews & Nanettte Elster, 
Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. LEG. MED. 35, 40 (2000).   
 provider.  Identifying information could be released, upon request, once the 
gamete offspring reach 18, or through a confidential intermediary system that 
would allow for national searches.  States should guarantee the release of such 
information to mature adults through laws that would preempt private agreements 
(such as between the gamete provider and the intending parents or between the 
gamete provider and a gamete bank) to the contrary.146  Although all states have 
addressed this issue for adoptees,147 few states have considered legislation on 
disclosure of the identity of gamete providers.      
 
V.  SUPPLY AND DEMAND 
 One of the primary arguments against disclosure of the identity of gamete 
providers is that it will have a negative effect on the supply of sperm.  If sperm 
providers know that they may be found, then they may be less likely to give 
gametic material out of fear that an unknown child will come knocking on 
their door twenty years later, while current practices appear to protect their 
ongoing anonymity.  Such reluctance might make it even more difficult to 
obtain sperm.  Indeed, after Sweden enacted legislation in 1985, which 
mandated the identification of gamete providers when the child reached the 
age of eighteen, there was some concern that the legislation had caused a 
decline in the number of sperm donors.148  According to more recent data, 
however, there appears to be an increase in the number of sperm providers.149 
 It appears then, that the requirement that children receive access to donor 
information will not necessarily result in a dramatic decrease in donors.150  In 
the adoption context, the two states that never sealed their birth certificates 
have adoption rates higher than the national average151; disclosure itself has not 
served as the deterrent that opponents fear.  The same concern about supply 
                                                 
146  The federal government could also act to ensure national uniformity on this issue, 
but this seems unlikely given the difficulty of enacting even a national consent registry.  
Senator  Carl Levin  has advocated the enactment of legislation to establish a federal 
mutual consent registry since 1980.  While the legislation has passed the Senate several 
times, it has never passed the House. The House Ways and Means Subcommittee did 
hold hearings to consider the registry.  See Mutual Voluntary Adoption Registries: 
Hearings on S. 1487 Before the Subcomm. on 
Hum. Res. of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. (1998) 
(statement of  Naomi  R.  Cahn,  Associate Professor of Law, George Washington 
University Law School).   
147  See, e.g ., Samuels, supra note __; Hollinger, supra  note 24, at 13-1. 
148  See Ken Daniels & Othon Lalos, The Swedish Insemination Act and the Availability 
of Donors, 10 HUM.  REPROD. 1871 (1995); F. Shenfield, Privacy Versus Disclosure in 
Gamete Donation: A Clash of Interest, of Duties, or an Exercise in Responsibility?, 14 J. 
ASSISTED REPROD.  AND GENETICS 371, 371 (1997).  In Sweden, there is only limited 
data on the immediate impact of the 1985 legislation.  Daniels & Lalos, supra , at 1872. 
149  Shenfield, supra  note 67, at 371 (parenthetical); Daniels & Lalos, supra note 67, at 
1872-1873 (parenthetical). 
150  In the adoption context, the two states – Alaska and Kansas – that never prevented 
disclosure have experienced higher-than-average adoption rates, and lower-than-average 
abortion rates.  See Cahn & Singer, supra  note 10, at #. 
151  See Samuels, supra note __. 
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has also been made in the context of banning payment for gametic material, 
but here again, the actual impact is uncertain.152  Moreover, the risk of a 
temporary shortage in gametic material is amply balanced by the benefits to 
gamete donor children by having access to this information.  While sale of 
gametes may be a commercial transaction for the seller, it has much broader 
implications for the children ultimately created; it is their interests, and, in 
many cases, the interests of their parents, which are respected through a 
disclosure regime. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Ultimately, and ironically, a failure to disclose the identity of birth 
parents or gamete providers reinforces the notion of the “exclusive”153 and 
traditional family.   It suggests that biological parents can and should play no 
role in their offspring’s lives.  It suggests that recognizing a child’s need for 
disclosure threatens parental rights.  And, it denies the possibilities for 
connection that biology can create.  The secrecy surrounding adoption 
developed during a period of pronatalism, a celebration of the nuclear family 
and of heterosexual motherhood and a corresponding condemnation of single 
mothers.154  It is emblematic of the attempt to make adoptive, or gamete, 
families “look like” other families, to create the family “‘as if’” it had been 
biologically created.155  LGBT families challenge his ideology simply through 
their existence.  Allowing for the release of identifying information is a 
rejection of a system which reifies the traditional “as if” family.    
 Even under a system of full disclosure, there certainly remains a 
distinction between “parenting” a child, and contributing to the creation of the 
child.156  The parents have a fundamental right to the control, care, and custody 
of their children;157  allowing information disclosure to adults respects parental 
rights to raise children as they see fit while the children are minors, but 
                                                 
152  See Schiff, supra note __, at 295; Garrison, supra  note -_, at 900-901.. 
153  See Alison Harvey Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the Paradigm of 
the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505, 554-555 (1998); Naomi R. Cahn, 
Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking, 57 OHIO ST . L.J. 1 (1997) (arguing that it may 
be appropriate to recognize the caretaking rights of more than two adults).  Recognizing 
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with Multiple Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, March 19, 1995, at 1; see also  Bartlett, Rethinking 
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154  See SOLINGER, supra  note 32. 
155  The “as if” terminology is from Professor Molly Shanley’s discussion of new 
families.  See Shanley, supra note __, at Ch. 1, p. 2 (defining “as if” families to be those 
in which the children can appear to be the biological offspring of their parents). 
156  See Polikoff, supra note __. 
157  See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Naomi Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 
67 GEO WASH. L. REV. 1225 (1999); cf.  Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Who Owns the 
Child?  Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. &  MARY L. REV. 995 
(1992).   
 respects the “children’s” rights once they are mature. While the rights and 
interests of biological parents and gamete providers should be accorded 
respect, a child should be entitled to receive information about the people  who 
helped to create her, her birth parents or gamete providers.  Such a right should 
be established both retroactively and prospectively,158 so adult offspring who 
today want information about their biological backgrounds are able to obtain it, 
and prospective adoptions and gamete provision arrangements should proceed 
in a legal context in which it is understood that offspring will have access to 
information once they become adults.  States need to enact legislation, and 
courts need to establish precedent for allowing disclosure.  Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse has suggested, in the context of transracial adoption, the need for a 
child to be able to “claim her ‘identity of origin,’ defined as a right to know 
and explore, commensurate with her evolving capacity for autonomy, her 
identity as a member of the family and group into which she was born.”159 
Applying this notion more generally in the adoption and gamete provision 
context, mature offspring in these families similarly need access to the ability 
to explore their biological families of origin.    
 Failing to disclose this information also, and again ironically, values 
contract over connection.160 We imagine that explicit contracts, between 
gamete providers and gamete banks, between biological parents and adoption 
agencies, and implicit contracts, between the ultimate parents, the biological 
parents, and the state, guaranteeing secrecy, are more important than the 
children’s needs for information, or the biological parent’s later needs for 
contact.  We live in a culture that respects kinship based on blood ties.161  It is 
perfectly possible and completely desirable to challenge conceptions of 
families based solely on blood by emphasizing intention and nurture.  Yet, in 
recognizing the formation and continuity of LGBT families through practice 
and intent, it is also important to acknowledge that genetic ties are important 
for a variety of reasons that do not threaten the integrity of functional families.   
 This is an example, both literally and figuratively, of the “second 
generation” of issues involved in LGBT family formation.  While the fight for 
recognition of LGBT families as families, with parents entitled to their full 
rights as parents is utterly critical because of their intent and their right to 
                                                 
158  For arguments on the propriety of “changing the rules mid-stream,” see Cahn & 
Singer, supra note __.  Given that adoption is a state-created relationship, and that the 
rights of all involved in gamete-transfer families are similarly state-regulated, courts have 
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159  Woodhouse, Are You My Mother? , supra note __, at 128; see also  Shanley, supra note 
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become parents, we should also take account of the potential needs for children 
in these families to learn the identity of the people who contributed to their 
creation.  As children grow older, not only do they more directly confront 
issues concerning their own personality development, but also their rights to 
information mature.  Without essentializing the notion of genetic connection, 
children may still want to know where they came from.          
   
 
 
